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I. INTRODUCTION
Barstucks, a Washington corporation, sells and brews a line of
specialty teas. Barstucks was incorporated in 1977 and has federally
registered its trademark. Barstucks has always been successful in its
local markets, and the business has skyrocketed nationally over the
past ten years. So much, in fact, that it now owns and operates stores
in forty-three states and advertises on a semi-national basis.
In 1998, a furniture manufacturer in Missouri decided to start
producing a line of upscale bar equipment. In order to create a mental
link between its potential customers and its product, the manufacturer
named its furniture "Barstucks." The furniture has been so named
without benefit of federal trademark protection. Barstucks is pro-
duced and sold in a strictly regional, tri-state area. The furniture
manufacturer advertises Barstucks in local media and in specialty
magazines.
In early spring of 2000, the tea company, Barstucks, discovered
that the Missouri furniture manufacturer was using its federally pro-
tected trademark. The tea company began proceedings against the
furniture manufacturer under federal trademark law, alleging a likeli-
hood of confusion and dilution.
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This Comment analyzes the above hypothetical and examines its
possible outcome under federal law that provides remedies for likeli-
hood of confusion and dilution. In so doing, this Comment seeks to
illustrate the differences between the two remedies and to clarify the
appropriate standard for the federal dilution law.
Congress provided the first federal remedy for trademark dilu-
tion in 1995 by enacting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA), which became effective on January 16, 1996.' The purpose
of the Act was to bring uniformity and consistency to the protection of
famous trademarks.' However, inconsistent judicial interpretation of
the Act has prevented this policy goal from being achieved. Much of
the inconsistency stems from differing interpretations of the fame
standard and what is required for a trademark to be "famous" and
thus deserving of protection. The conflicting interpretations are ex-
emplified by the Third Circuit case, Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v.
Las Vegas Sporting News, L.L. C., 3 and the Ninth Circuit case, Avery
Dennison v. Sumpton.4 This Comment argues that courts should uni-
formity hold (1) that marks are not subject to separate tests for dis-
tinctiveness and fame and (2) that marks do not warrant protection on
a national level simply by proving niche market fame.
This Comment contains six main parts. Part II analyzes the
Lanham Act of 19461 and the likelihood of confusion standard, which
led to the enactment of the FTDA. Part III briefly examines the his-
tory of dilution and then looks at the FTDA. Part IV focuses on the
FTDA's legislative history and intent. In light of the discussion in the
foregoing parts, Part V examines differing interpretations of fame as
demonstrated by the decisions by the Third and Ninth Circuits,
which illustrate and incorporate the differing interpretations of the
FTDA among other circuits. In Part VI, this Comment concludes by
proposing a uniform standard for all courts to follow.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000));
see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:83 (4th ed. 2000).
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1033.
3. 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
4. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
5. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000)).
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II. THE LANHAM ACT OF 1946 AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION STANDARD
A trademark is any word, name, symbol, or device, or any com-
bination thereof used to identify and distinguish one's goods from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if the source is unknown. 6 Trademarks represent a busi-
ness's goodwill and help it identify its goods and services, which are
among its most valuable assets.7
Although the first federal trademark act was passed in 1870,8
trademark law was largely undeveloped until the passage of the
Lanham Act in 1946. 9 The Lanham Act serves two purposes: (1) to
protect the interests of the public by ensuring confidence that the
products purchased bear a favorable trademark and are the products
asked for and wanted and (2) to protect the interests of the trademark
holder who "spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the pub-
lic the product ... from ... misappropriation by the pirates and
cheats.""°
Under the Lanham Act, "likelihood of confusion" is the tradi-
tional test for trademark infringement. To succeed on a trademark in-
fringement claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's use is
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."" A fed-
eral claim for infringement of an unregistered mark under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act is triggered by a use which "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, con-
nection, or association" of the user with the senior user. 12
In the Barstucks hypothetical, in order for the tea company to
succeed on a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act,
the company would have to show that the furniture manufacturer's
use of the "Barstucks" trademark is likely to cause confusion, mistake,
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
7. Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong.
33 (1995) (statement of Philip G. Hampton, Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks, Patent
and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
8. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3.
9. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 2 (1988).
10. Christopher R. Perry, Trademarks as Commodities: The "Famous" Roadblock to Applying
Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2000) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)); see also S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4.
11. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). The term "senior" user in this Comment denotes user of a
mark that has achieved protectable status first. The term "junior" user is used to denote subse-
quent user of the same or substantially similar mark.
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or deception among consumers as to what the trademark pertains to:
selling and brewing tea or manufacturing specialty furniture. Because
the two marks are the same and the tea company has a senior use and
has federally registered the mark, the company may succeed on such a
claim. However, since the two businesses' uses are of such a different
character, the furniture manufacturer may be able to succeed on a de-
fense that no reasonable consumer would confuse a local furniture
manufacturer and a national corporation that sells and brews teas.
Therefore, the tea company might not have had a federal remedy
under the Lanham Act. The unavailability of federal protection for
trademarks such as the one in this hypothetical illustrates why many
felt the need for a revision in the Lanham Act to reflect changes in law
and business practices."
III. DILUTION AND THE FTDA
This revision in federal trademark law came in the form of the
FTDA. Before the enactment of the FTDA in 1995, Frank I.
Schechter had analyzed the concept of dilution in his 1927 article.14 In
this article, Schechter argued that to limit trademark protection to a
confusion standard ignores the fact that the value of a trademark also
lies in the owner of the mark preserving the uniqueness or individual-
ity of the trademark."3 Schechter opined that "once a mark has come
to indicate to the public a constant and uniform source of satisfaction,
its owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for the natural
expansion of his trade to other lines or fields of enterprise."16 The idea
of protecting a mark outside its "field of enterprise" is a key compo-
nent of dilution theory.17
Dilution theory differs from likelihood of confusion theory in
that the former provides "protection to strong, well-recognized marks
even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion, if defendant's use is
such as to diminish or dilute the strong identification value of the
plaintiffs mark even while not confusing customers as to source,
sponsorship, affiliation or connection."1 8 The underlying premise of
dilution doctrine is that there is a "gradual whittling away" or dissolu-
13. S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2, 4.
14. Frank I. Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
15. Id. at 821-22.
16. Id. at 823 (internal quotations omitted); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1033.
17. Id.
18. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:70.
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tion of the identity and strength of the mark within public conscious-
ness even when the mark is used by non-competing goods."9
Prior to the passage of the FTDA, there was no federal remedy
for dilution. However, numerous states already had statutes providing
such cause of action. To date, thirty-four states have antidilution
statutes.20 Even though a large number of states had antidilution stat-
utes, the need for a federal remedy was apparent because without fed-
eral protection, the owner of a mark must file suit in each state in or-
der to receive protection in the respective state. Furthermore, since
some states do not have antidilution statutes, it is impossible for the
owner of a mark to receive national protection absent a federal statute.
Although the 1988 Trademark Revision Act did not contain a federal
antidilution provision, the Trademark Review Commission's report
and a bill introduced to the Senate did contain such a provision.21 The
House of Representatives, however, did not pass the provision, and
the provision was absent from the bill finally ratified by the House and
Senate.22
In 1995, approximately fifty years after the Lanham Act was
passed, an antidilution provision was finally adopted in the form of the
FTDA. The Act provides:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution
19. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (N.D. Il. 1996).
20. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (Michie 1999); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 44-1448.01 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1996); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 14330(a) (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-Ili(c) (1999); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. 495.151 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b)
(Harrison 1998); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10356/65 (West 2000);
IOWA CODE § 548.113 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 11OB, § 12 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. § 333.285 (West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25
(1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:3-13.20 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 1997); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 360-1 (McKinney Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1988); 54 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1124 (West Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-
1165 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1999); W. VA. CODE
§ 47-2-13 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 1999).
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:86.
22. Id. (describing a body of opinion that voiced strong opposition to enacting a federal
antidilution law that was "vague, nebulous, and potentially anti-competitive").
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of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such
other relief as is provided in this subsection. 23
Thus, in order to succeed on a dilution claim, a plaintiff must
prove four elements: (1) its mark is famous; (2) the defendant has
made a commercial use in commerce of the plaintiffs mark or trade
name; (3) the defendant's use of the mark began after the plaintiffs
mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark.
In determining the first factor, whether the plaintiffs mark has
the requisite fame and distinctiveness, the FTDA lists eight non-
exclusive factors a court can consider:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading ar-
eas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and
the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on
the principal register.2"
Whether the hypothetical tea company's use of the "Barstucks"
trademark satisfies the fame requirement will be analyzed later in this
Comment.
The second requirement is that the defendant make a commercial
use in commerce. Noncommercial use is excepted under the statute. 21
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
24. Id.
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In determining whether this element is established, courts may utilize
a two-step analysis: whether the use was "in commerce" and whether
the use was commercial in nature.26
First, a court determines whether the use was "in commerce."
This requirement is construed liberally 2l to mean "all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress."2s The FTDA assists courts
in interpreting this requirement by providing that the use be bona fide
in the ordinary course of trade:29
For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in
use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their contain-
ers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or la-
bels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with
the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or ad-
vertising of services and the services are rendered in com-
merce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or
in the United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection
with the services. 30
Second, a court determines whether a use of the mark "Bar-
stucks" was commercial in nature. Using a mark with a commercial
designation is not sufficient; this requirement usually entails a court
determining whether the defendant used the mark in some type of
business transaction.31
In the context of the hypothetical, a court is likely to find that the
furniture manufacturer's use of the mark was a "commercial use in
commerce." The manufacture and sale of furniture in a tri-state re-
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,
1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("The exception for non-commercial use of a famous mark is intended to
prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally-protected speech."), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998).
26. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
27. Id.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 (finding that although the ".com" Internet desig-
nation does not automatically constitute a commercial use, the plaintiff's use was commercial
because it involved the sale of computer software).
20021
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gion is commerce, and the manufacturer's use of the mark through its
advertisement is commercial in nature.
The third element requires that the defendant's use of the mark
begin after the plaintiffs mark has already become famous. In inter-
preting this element, courts construe the term according to its ordinary
English language sense."
To meet the fourth requirement, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's use causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.
For dilution to occur, the public must make a mental connection be-
tween the mark and both parties. 33 The mental association occurs on
an intuitive level, and even though the public perceives distinct
sources and affiliations between the plaintiffs and defendant's uses,
the senior user's ability to use the mark as a unique identifier may be
weakened as the public associates the mark with a new and different
source. 3
The FTDA contemplates two types of dilution: "blurring" and
"tarnishment."3 Prior to the passage of the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act (ACPA) of 1999,36 courts utilized a third theory
of dilution-"cybersquatting. '" 37  However, by enacting the ACPA,
Congress has amended the Lanham Act to make cybersquatting a dis-
tinctive cause of action.
Dilution by blurring occurs when the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs mark causes the mark to become vague and less distinctive
because the public no longer associates the use of the mark solely in
connection with the plaintiff.38 Although some courts have required
proof of actual harm,3 many courts assess whether blurring has oc-
curred by applying the "Mead factors" to infer a likelihood of dilu-
tion.40 These factors include (1) similarity of the marks, (2) similarity
of the products covered by the marks, (3) sophistication of consumers,
32. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999).
33. Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
34. Id.
35. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
36. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(d) (2000)).
37. Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 10066 HB, 2000 WL 973745, at
-2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that cybersquatting is generally defined as "the bad-faith and abu-
sive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the
goodwill associated with such marks-a practice commonly").
38. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168
(3d Cir. 2000).
39. Ringling Bros.-Barnum Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
40. Id. at 463.
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(4) predatory intent, (5) renown of the senior mark, and (6) renown of
the junior mark.4'
In the Barstucks hypothetical, a court may find that the furniture
manufacturer's use blurs the distinctive quality of the tea company's
use. Although the public may not confuse the two marks, the fact that
there are two uses of the mark may reduce the value of the tea com-
pany's senior mark by making the mark vague and less distinctive.
However, some courts have criticized the Mead dilution test as
an offspring of the likelihood of confusion test, finding it not particu-
larly relevant or helpful in analyzing dilution by blurring.42 To this
end, courts, including the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc. ," have supplemented the traditional test and formulated a
more comprehensive set of factors for dilution by blurring. 44
Tarnishment takes place when the plaintiffs mark is "linked to
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or un-
savory context," with the result that "the public will associate the lack
of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plain-
tiffs unrelated goods. '" 4 Although tarnishment often occurs when the
mark is placed in the context of sexual, obscene, or illegal activity, 46 it
is not restricted to such sordid uses.47
A court is unlikely to find dilution by tarnishment in the Bar-
stucks hypothetical. The furniture manufacturer's use is not in any
way unwholesome or unsavory. Its use is not likely to reduce the
quality or prestige of the tea company's trademark.
41. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d
Cir 1989).
42. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 168.
43. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
44. Id. at 228.
The Mead Data test ... fails to include a number of the factors ... that we believe to
be pertinent. Those include actual confusion and likelihood of confusion, shared con-
sumers and geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and the inter-
related factors of duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the
senior in bringing the action.
Id.
45. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
46. See Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467
F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods.,
Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).
47. See Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that plaintiffs trademark deserves protection against defendant's where the ill repute of
the defendant's mark will be conveyed to the plaintiffs mark), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
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The standard remedy for dilution under the FTDA is an injunc-
tion against the defendant's use of the plaintiffs famous mark. 4' How-
ever, if the defendant has "willfully intended to trade on the owner's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark," the plaintiff may
be entitled to recover an award up to treble damages, reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and destruction of the items using the offending mark.49
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE FTDA
A. Legislative History
Before Congress passed the FTDA in 1995, the idea of enacting
a federal antidilution statute had been discussed. Between 1985 and
1987, the United States Trademark Association (USTA) conducted a
two-year study, culminating in the Report and Recommendations of
the United States Trademark System and the Lanham Act, which
served as the basis for the 1988 bill, S. 1883.10 Among those who con-
tributed to the study were the Trademark Review Commission's
twenty-nine members as well as "hundreds of trademark owners and
practitioners, more than fifty organizations, government officials in
the United States and abroad, and eminent scholars in the fields of
constitutional, commercial, trademark, and unfair competition law."S
Even though the bill was ultimately defeated, 2 the USTA adopted an-
other resolution in 1991 in support of a Lanham Act amendment simi-
lar to the one previously proposed. 3
When the issue resurfaced in 1995, Congress was more receptive
and passed the FTDA5 4 Since the language of the FTDA is essen-
tially the same as the 1988 proposal, the following two sources provide
useful legislative history for interpreting the 1995 Act: (1) the Trade-
mark Review Commission Report of 1987 and (2) the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report of 1988. 55
These two sources are important because the FTDA passed with
minimal opposition or hearing in the House and the Senate. The 1995
48. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13[3][a]; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000).
49. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:99; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000);
15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000).
50. S. REP. No. 100- 515, at 2 (1988).
51. Id.
52. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:70.
53. Jerome Gilson, Dilution Law: At a Crossroads? A Federal Dilution Statute: Is it Time?,
83 TRADEMARK REP. 107, 115 (1993).
54. Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation
and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 83 (1996).
55. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:87.
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Act has a modest legislative history for interpreting the ambiguous
language. 6
B. Legislative Intent
As previously mentioned, with the enactment of the FTDA,
Congress sought to bring uniformity and consistency to the protection
of famous marks. 7 The newly created federal cause of action was also
consistent with the United State's international trademark obliga-
tions.58
The FTDA is intended to protect famous marks from dilution of
their distinctive qualities that results from subsequent, unauthorized
commercial uses. 9 Dilution focuses on the mark owner's investment
in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself.60 To
prove the mark's distinctive quality, the plaintiff must show that the
mark has come to signify the plaintiffs product for a significant por-
tion of consumers.6' A mark is diluted when the unauthorized use"reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something
unique, singular, or particular." 62
Since famous marks are ordinarily used on a national basis and
dilution was redressable only on a patch-quilt system of protection, a
federal remedy was timely and relevant. 63 Much of the early legislative
history endorsed the view that a mark must be "substantially exclusive
throughout a significant portion of the United States." 64
In its introductory "dilution" paragraph, Senate Report 100-515
states that a federal dilution remedy should be highly selective and
should only protect marks that are truly famous and in danger of hav-
ing the distinctive quality of its mark diluted. 65 It is the intention of
the FTDA to protect only a narrow category of marks. "Examples in-
56. Id.
57. H.R REP. NO. 104-374, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1033.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copy-
rights, and Trademarks, Senate Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong. 73 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks].
61. Id. (quoting Wedgewood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 380 (Or. 1983) (en
banc).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Hearings on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, supra note 60, at 33.
65. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 7 (1988).
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clude situations where Kodak is used for pianos, or Buick is used for
aspirin." 6
Congress, concerned with the FTDA supplanting current trade-
mark protection based on likelihood of confusion, placed great empha-
sis on the factors to consider whether a mark possesses a sufficient
level of fame and distinctiveness for federal protection. 7 Each factor is
to be weighed individually; for there to be requisite fame, the cumula-
tive effect of the considerations must warrant a conclusion that a mark
qualifies for federal protection. 68
In answering questions pertaining to statutory language, Senator
DeConcini in a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing explained why
the USTA chose the term "famous" over the term "strong." 69 In his
explanation, he described that the term "strong" is often applied to
coined, arbitrary, or fanciful marks.7 ° These terms are without mean-
ing and act only as an indicator of source or origin of products.71
These terms are also used for widely advertised marks that are known
to the public, even if the identification is local.12
Famous marks, on the other hand, encompass only those marks
that are widely recognized, regardless of distinctiveness." Because the
USTA believes that only marks that are distinctive and famous are de-
serving of federal protection, it necessarily follows that a federal rem-
edy should apply only to "famous" marks and not necessarily to marks
that are merely "strong." 74
Given that the federal cause of action applies only to "famous"
marks and should be construed narrowly, the FTDA does not pre-
empt state law. 75 State statutes and common law are still valuable be-
cause marks that are not "famous" enough to receive protection on a
national level should still be able to obtain local or regional protec-
tion.76
In sum, the FTDA's legislative history makes it clear that federal
dilution law should be available only for a select group of marks that
66. Id.
67. Id. at 41-42.
68. Id. at 42.
69. Hearings on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, supra note 60, at 204.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 205.
75. Id. "Preemption" is defined as "the principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause)
that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed. 2000).
76. Hearings on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, supra note 60, at 205.
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are truly famous enough to warrant national protection. Marks that
are not deserving of such protection should be restricted to state statu-
tory or common law remedies.
IV. CONFLICTING CIRCUITS: THIRD CIRCUIT'S TIMES MIRROR
AND NINTH CIRCUIT'S AVERY DENNISON
A. Factual Background
1. Times Mirror
The Sporting News is a weekly sports publication owned and pub-
lished by Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.17 The name of the publica-
tion was granted federal trademark protection in 1886 .8 The maga-
zine reports on baseball, basketball, football, and hockey and has a
weekly circulation of approximately 540,000 in the United States and
Canada. 9 The Sporting News does not provide any information on
gambling because Times Mirror "believe[s] that there is a portion of
the population that is adamantly opposed to gambling and that they
would not look favorably on any of [its] products if they thought [the
magazine was] promoting gambling in any way. ' '80
The Sporting News advertises on television, in direct mail solicita-
tions, in promotions, and periodically on the radio.81 In an attempt to
increase the quality of the publication and to increase readership,
Times Mirror spent millions of dollars promoting the publication in
the years preceding the litigation.12
Las Vegas Sports News (LVSN) publishes Las Vegas Sporting
News, which contains articles, editorials, and advertisements on sports
wagering "for the sports gambling enthusiasts or individuals that like
to take a risk." 83 The magazine is published forty-five times a year
and has a circulation of 42,000 and 100,000 for general and special
editions, respectively84  Even though it is sold at several hundred
77. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 160
(3d Cir. 2000).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 161.
80. Id. (quoting Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, L.L.C., No.
CIV. A. 98-CV5768, 1999 WL 124416, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4,1999)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting the testimony of LVSN publisher, Dennis Atiyeh).
84. Id.
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newsstands across the country, most copies are given away in gam-
bling casinos free of charge.8 5
In 1997, LVSN changed the name of its publication from Las
Vegas Sports News to Las Vegas Sporting News (1) because it wanted to
separate itself from the bad reputation of the previous publisher and
(2) because the term "sporting" more accurately reflected the content
of the publication.6
Times Mirror first learned of LVSN in August of 1997 and sent
LVSN a cease and desist letter on September 24, 1997.7 After settle-
ment negotiations broke down, and Times Mirror conducted an inves-
tigation regarding the availability of LVSN, 8s Times Mirror filed a
complaint in a federal district court alleging infringement, false desig-
nation of origin, and dilution under the Lanham Act as well as com-
mon law unfair competition and infringement.81
The district court found that Times Mirror was likely to succeed
on the merits of its federal trademark dilution claim and granted the
company's request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining LVSN from
using the term "Sporting News" in its publication."0 The parties
agreed that the injunction would be stayed pending appeal9'
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not
err in finding that The Sporting News was famous in the sports peri-
odicals market. 2 The Third Circuit therefore affirmed the district
court's ruling and held that the benefits from the preliminary injunc-
tion did not substantially outweigh the injury that LVSN would suf-
fer.93
2. Avery Dennison
In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,9 4 Avery Dennison sued the
defendants alleging trademark dilution under the FTDA and a state
statute.95 Avery Dennison sells office supplies and industrial fasteners
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 162. A private investigator visited three newsstands in or around Lehigh Valley,
Pennsylvania. One newsstand carried both publications with the LVSN near other sporting
magazines and The Sporting News near the tabloids. He also found the LVSN at two other news-
stands. At one such stand, the two magazines were located within inches of each other.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 166.
93. Id. at 169.
94. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 873.
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under the trademarks "Avery" and "Dennison." 96 The mark "Avery"
has been in use since the 1930s and was registered in 1963; the mark
"Dennison" has been used since the 1880s and registered since 1908.11
Avery Dennison's annual advertising budget, including that for those
separately marketed "Avery" and "Dennison" marks, is more than
five million dollars.8 The company makes approximately three billion
dollars in sales per year.99 Avery Dennison also markets its products
on the Internet, maintaining the domain names "avery.com" and"averydennison.com. '"100
The defendant Jerry Sumpton is the president of the defendant
Internet e-mail provider, Freeview Listings, which does business as
"Mailbank."' ' Mailbank offers "vanity" email addresses to users and
registers thousands of domain name combinations for this purpose."2
Most of the domain names that Mailbank registers are common sur-
names, even though some registrations are for hobbies, careers, pets,
sports interests, and music."3 Mailbank's surname archives include
the domain names avery.net and dennison.net.104
The U.S. District Court of California concluded as a matter of
law that Avery Dennison's trademarks were famous °s and denied
summary judgment to Sumpton and granted summary judgment to
Avery Dennison on the dilution claims."6 It granted an injunction re-
quiring Sumpton to transfer the registrations to Avery Dennison.'0
The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment rulings and
remanded to the district court to enter summary judgment for Sump-
ton and Freeview. 1°8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Avery Denni-
son established acquired distinctiveness but did not meet the threshold
element of fame.
The Third and Ninth Circuits did not significantly differ in in-
terpreting the following elements: (1) the defendant has made a com-
mercial use in commerce of the plaintiffs mark or trade name; (2) the
defendant's use of the mark began after the plaintiffs mark became
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 872.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 873.
105. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
106. Id. at 1342.
107. Id.
108. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 881-82.
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famous; and (3) the defendant's use causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark."°9 For this reason, this Comment focuses its
analysis on the "fame" element: specifically, whether a mark must be
distinctive and famous and whether fame within a niche market is suf-
ficient for a finding of overall fame.
B. Fame Analysis
1. Distinctive and Famous
Both the Third and Ninth Circuits started their analyses with the
fame requirement."' However, the courts diverged on whether a mark
must be distinctive and famous or just merely famous under the
FTDA."' Although some courts hold that a mark must pass inde-
pendent tests for famousness and distinctiveness, this Comment as-
serts that under the FTDA, the phrase "distinctive and famous"
commands only one requirement. This assertion is supported by the
Third Circuit in Times Mirror and by a leading commentator.
In Avery Dennison, the Ninth Circuit held that in order to be eli-
gible for protection under the FTDA, a plaintiff must show that its
mark is both distinctive and famous."' In defending the dual re-
quirement, the court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and
found it to indicate that "a higher standard must be employed to
gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this extraordinary rem-
edy.""' In order to be diluted, a mark must have a degree of distinct-
iveness and strength beyond that needed to become a trademark."'
The court then reasoned that if a mark must be distinctive to be pro-
tected and if distinctiveness satisfies the element of fame, then there
would be no trademarks outside the scope of the FTDA."' In other
words, if proof of distinctiveness satisfies fame, then all trademarks are
famous because a mark must be distinctive to be a trademark.
The Ninth Circuit's position was echoed by the defendant in
Nabisco, a case cited in Times Mirror. In Times Mirror, LVSN con-
tended that Times Mirror must separately prove that its mark was
109. See id. at 874; Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, L.L.C.,
212 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2000).
110. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874; Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 162.
111. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 166.
112. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876 (citing S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988)).
113. Id. (quoting 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 461 (1987)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659, 690 (1998)).
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both distinctive and famous. 116 To demonstrate the division among
the courts on this question, the Third Circuit cited Nabisco, a leading
case holding that the FTDA imposes a dual distinctiveness and fa-
mousness requirement.117
In Nabisco, the plaintiff, Pepperidge Farms (PF), was a producer
of small orange crackers in the shape of goldfish and had operated the
business continuously since 1962.118 The crackers came in a bag or
box under the trade name "Goldfish" and exhibited a picture of the
cracker on the exterior.119 In 1998, Nabisco entered into an agreement
with Nickelodeon, whereby Nabisco would produce cheese crackers in
shapes based on the CatDog cartoon.1 20 Pursuant to this agreement,
Nabisco developed small orange crackers, with one-quarter of them in
the shape of a fish. 12' PF sued Nabisco, alleging federal trademark in-
fringement and dilution. 12
In Nabisco, the Second Circuit held that the FTDA clearly re-
quires distinctiveness in addition to fame. 123 The court examined the
language of the FTDA and pointed out the part that states that "the
[junior] person's... use... cause[s] dilution of the distinctive quality
of the [senior] mark.' 24 If a mark is not distinctive, its distinctive
qualities cannot be diluted. 25 If a mark is famous, yet not distinctive,
the quality that is to be protected under the Act is lacking.126 The
court listed several marks that are famous but "of the common or
quality-claiming or prominence-claiming type-such as American,
National, Federal, First, United, Acme, Merit, or Ace.' 127 According
to the court, it is unlikely that the FTDA contemplated allowing such
common, yet famous, marks to preclude all new entrants. 12 The court
stated that a mark could be famous without being distinctive and
pointed out the following examples: "American Airlines, American
Tobacco Company, British Airways, Federated Department Stores,
Allied Stores or the First National Bank of whatever.'" 29
116. Times Mirror, 212 F.3dat 163-64.
117. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 212.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 213.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 216.
124. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 227-28.
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The Third Circuit in Times Mirror rejected the contention that a
mark need be both distinctive and famous in order to receive protec-
tion under the FTDA.130 In so doing, the court examined the opinion
of Joseph McCarthy, the leading commentator on the subject. 131 Even
though the legislative history explicates that a mark must be both truly
famous and distinctive,'32 as McCarthy explains it, the genesis of the
language of the FTDA contained the dual requirement of distinctive-
ness and famousness because the USTA wanted to restrict protection
to marks "which are both distinctive, as established by federal regis-
tration at a minimum, and famous, as established by separate evi-
dence.' ' 133 The term "distinctive" was inserted as hyperbole to ensure
that marks must be registered before seeking protection under the
Act."' However, when the House amended the bill, the registration
requirement was dropped, and Congress neglected to drop the "dis-
tinctive" language in introducing the factors. 135 This failure to drop
the "distinctive" language left the requirement floating in the statute,
unmoored to the statutory requirement or underlying policy goal. 136
For this reason, McCarthy does not view the distinctiveness re-
quirement as establishing a separate statutory obligation other than
that a mark be famous. 137 In other words, "distinctiveness" is simply a
synonym for "fame" and to regard it as a separate requirement would
be redundant. 138
In order for a mark to be eligible for protection under the Act,
basic trademark principles dictate that a mark be distinctive either in-
herently or through acquisition of secondary meaning. 139 In determin-
ing whether a mark is distinctive, courts have traditionally divided the
marks into five categories: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive,
(4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful. 140 Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful
marks are deemed inherently distinctive, descriptive marks must show
130. See Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 166-67.
131. Id. at 167.
132. S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 41 (1988).
133. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:91 (quoting 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 459-60
(1987)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 24:91.1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 39 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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secondary meaning to be protected, and generic marks are not protect-
able. 141
To establish secondary meaning, a trademark owner must show
that, in the minds of the public, "the primary significance of a product
feature is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself."'42 Source identification can be established in several ways, and
courts can weigh a number of factors, including the length or exclusiv-
ity of the use of the mark, the size or prominence of plaintiffs enter-
prise, the existence of substantial advertising by plaintiff, the prod-
uct's established place in the market, and proof of intentional
copying. 143
McCarthy asserts that a mark's distinctiveness, whether it be ac-
quired inherently or through secondary meaning, is nowhere near suf-
ficient to achieve the status of a famous mark.'14  Distinctiveness
merely establishes the floor required to achieve trademark status, and
the FTDA requires much more.1 4' As McCarthy explains it, "a
trademark cannot be 'famous' unless it is 'distinctive,' but it can be
'distinctive' without being 'famous. ' "'146
McCarthy also comments on the drafting of the language of the
FTDA. As noted earlier, the FTDA states that the owner of a famous
mark is entitled to an injunction against another's use of a mark that
causes "dilution of the distinctive quality of the [plaintiffs] mark.' ' 47
However, the FTDA also defines dilution in terms of "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or ser-
vices.""'' Read together, the two sections would provide that "the
owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction if another's use of
a mark causes 'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services of the distinctive quality of the
mark. ' " 49 In McCarthy's opinion, this is awkward syntax that needs
correction.,5 " The phrase "distinctive quality" is hyperbole and repeti-
tious for emphasis, and all that should be required is dilution in the
141. Id.
142. Id. at 41-42 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11
(1982)).
143. Id. at 42 (citing Presidents & Trs. of Colby Coll. v. Colby Coll. -New Hampshire, 508
F.2d 804, 807-08 (1st Cir. 1975)); see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:30 (4th ed. 2000).
144. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:91.1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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sense of the lessened capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods and services."'
This reasoning counters the concerns stressed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Avery Dennison. Even though there is no independent re-
quirement of distinctiveness in determining whether a mark is eligible
for protection under the Act, a mark must be famous, which is a
higher standard than distintictiveness.
McCarthy also criticized the Second Circuit's opinion in Nabisco.
As stated earlier, the court in Nabisco held that distinctiveness is a re-
quirement independent of fame."2 Even though the Second Circuit
held that some marks could be famous but not distinctive, the court
reached this conclusion without clearly defining the word "distinc-
tive.""' 3 It does appear, however, that the court adopted a definition at
odds with the traditional meaning of the word "distinctive" in trade-
mark law. 54 The opinion seems to imply that the FTDA does not
protect famous but non-inherently famous marks."5
The Second Circuit's opinion seems to contradict the purpose of
the FTDA (1) by elevating the requirement that a plaintiff prove in-
dependently that its mark is both distinctive and famous and (2) by
redefining the term "distinctive.'" 1 6 As to the first requirement, the
court seems to conclude that since both "distinctive" and "famous"
terms were used, each must constitute an independent requirement.
However, the Second Circuit seems to overlook the fact that Anglo-
American law has a tradition of doubling words in a context where
both words have the same meaning: "'to have and to hold,' 'each and
all,' 'aid and abet,' 'null and void,' and 'cease and desist. 157
Second, the court seems to change the traditional definition of the
word "distinctive" as used in trademark law by protecting only inher-
ently distinctive marks. 118 The apparent reason for such a change is to
limit the number of marks eligible for protection under the FTDA."9
However, in order for a mark to be protectable, it must be distinc-
tive.160 By allowing only inherently distinctive marks to be protected,
151. Id.
152. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
153. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:91.2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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the Second Circuit adopted a definition that is inconsistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's definition of the word."'
This Comment asserts that in the Barstucks hypothetical, the tea
manufacturer, Barstucks, need only show that its mark has achieved
the requisite amount of fame, not that its mark has become distinctive
and famous.
2. The Significance of Niche Market Fame
While the Third Circuit held that fame within a niche market is
sufficient for a finding of overall fame, the approach taken by the
Ninth Circuit-that niche market fame is only a factor in deciding
overall fame-adheres to the legislative intent of the FTDA and is a
preferable approach.
In Times Mirror, the Third Circuit held that "fame" within a
niche or specialized market is sufficient to satisfy the fame require-
ment under the Act. 162 However, upon close examination, it becomes
apparent that this holding stands on questionable grounds. Instead of
being an independently satisfactory basis for a finding of fame, "fame"
within a niche market should satisfy only one factor in the famousness
inquiry.
The Third Circuit began its analysis by laying the foundation of
the FTDA, including the elements and the fame factors. 163 The court
then began a discussion of niche market fame.164 In rejecting the ap-
pellant's claim that niche market fame is insufficient, the court dis-
missed one of the primary cases that the appellant relied on, Washing-
ton Speakers Bureau, Inc v. Leading Authorities, Inc. ,161 without paying
the case proper attention. The Third Circuit decided that since the
proposition that niche market fame is not sufficient under the Act was
not dispositive in Washington Speakers and was stated as a matter of
dicta, the case was not particularly helpful.66
However, had the Third Circuit examined the reasoning in that
case, the court may have found it useful. In Washington Speakers, the
plaintiff, Washington Speakers Bureau (WSB), was a prominent lec-
ture agency based in Virginia. 167 It had used its name continuously for
eighteen years and was widely known within the business and political
161. id.; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
162. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 164.
163. Id. at 163.
164. Seeid. at 164.
165. 33 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000).
166. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 164 (citing Washington Speakers, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 503).
167. Washington Speakers, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
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speaker circle.6s The defendant, Leading Authorities, was involved in
the business of staging meetings and used various speakers, including
many political personalities.6 In 1998, Leading Authorities registered
the domain name "washingtonspeakers.com," and when WSB later
tried to register the same domain name, it discovered that the domain
name was already in use by Leading Authorities.Y17 When Leading
Authorities indicated that it would not transfer the domain name,
WSB initiated an action against Leading Authorities alleging dilution
and likelihood of confusion.'"
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ana-
lyzed the merits of the niche market theory of fame. The court dis-
counted the theory based on the legislative intent to prevent dilution
of trademarks even by those who are not in direct competition with the
famous mark's owner. '  The court reasoned that permitting the
owner of a mark to prevent dilution only by competitors would con-
tradict this Congressional purpose.'73 The court stated that when the
plaintiff and defendant are in competition, a likelihood of confusion
action would be more appropriate.'74 In fact, the court ultimately or-
dered Leading Authorities to relinquish the domain names based on
the likelihood of confusion standard.173
Even though the court did not find fame based on the niche mar-
ket theory, it did reason that fame within a niche market is a factor in
determining overall fame. 76  It declared that the language of the
FTDA lends some support to the argument that marks famous within
a niche market can be protected against marks directed at the same
market.171 However, this is only one factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether a mark is famous.1
Even though the court did not ultimately decide whether niche
market fame standing alone can meet the fame requirement, the above
reasoning does lend credence to the assertion that niche market fame is
168. Id. at 490-91.
169. Id. at 491.
170. Id. at 491, 493.
171. Id. at 493.
172. Id. at 503.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 501.
176. Id. at 503-04.
177. Id. at 503.
178. Id. at 503-04 (pointing out the FTDA language that lists, as a famousness factor, "the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks'
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought").
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not adequate for a finding of overall fame but can be utilized as a fac-
tor in such a finding.
After quickly dismissing Washington Speakers, the Third Circuit
in Times Mirror recognized wide variation on the issue of whether
niche market fame warrants protection under the FTDA.'79 The court
indicated that the differing lines of authority about the sufficiency of
niche market fame are divided into the following two contexts: (1)
cases holding that niche market fame is insufficient because the plain-
tiff and defendant are in separate markets and (2) cases holding that
niche market fame is a factor indicating fame because plaintiff and de-
fendant are in the same or related markets.8 10 To illustrate this point,
the Third Circuit cited Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper
Corp.""' and Nabisco. The court's reliance upon these authorities ap-
pears to be misplaced.
In Syndicate Sales, the plaintiff, Syndicate Sales, produced plastic
baskets used for floral bouquets at funerals. 12 It offered the "#92"
and "#95" basket and had sold fifty million and ten million of each,
respectively." 3 The defendant, Hampshire Paper, originally a floral
products company, decided to enter the plastic products market in
1994.111 Hampshire Paper began producing the "#9200" and "#9500"
baskets, modeled after Syndicate's baskets.15 Syndicate filed suit and
alleged both federal trademark infringement and dilution.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court below erred in
holding that a trade dress cannot be famous based on niche market
status and remanded the case." 6 The Seventh Circuit addressed the
same two contexts of the authority on niche market fame as did the
Third Circuit. Both circuits used language that niche market fame is
only a "factor" indicating fame. This suggests the courts' view that
niche market fame should not, by itself, constitute overall fame. In
fact, the Seventh Circuit, after finding that fame is possible within a
niche market, remanded the case for determination of fame on the re-
maining factors under the FTDA. 8 7 On remand, the district court
179. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 164.
180. Id.
181. 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
182. Id. at 635.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 641.
187. Id.
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found that the fame requirement was not met and denied the plaintiff
dilution protection. 188
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit analyzed factor F:
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought1s9 In so doing, the court acknowledged that the"narrowness of the market in which a plaintiffs mark has fame is a
factor that must be considered in the balance."19° This language is
significant in that it indicates that fame within a narrow market may
not be enough to confer nationwide protection. This view is but-
tressed by the legislative intent underlying the FTDA. In analyzing
factor E, a Senate Report stated that there must be substantial renown
or fame within the trading area of the mark and the trading area of the
other party. 91 However, this does not necessarily make a mark eligible
for protection if the mark is used in an insubstantial trading area. 92
Either way, all the factors must be weighed, and none of them is de-
terminative. 193
Furthermore, Nabisco, the other case that the Third Circuit cites
to support its proposition that niche market fame is sufficient, does
not appear to be of any great help. The Second Circuit in that case
found that PF demonstrated a likelihood of success on its dilution
claim and affirmed an injunction against Nabisco.194 In so doing, the
court set forth the following language quoted by the Third Circuit:
"dilution can occur where [defendant's] use competes directly with the
[plaintiffs] as well as where the [defendant] is in a non-competing
market. In general, the closer the products are to one another [in the
marketplace], the greater the likelihood of confusion and dilution."19
However, neither this language, nor any other language of the Second
Circuit in Nabisco, explicitly endorses a niche market theory of fame.
The language quoted refers, more or less, to factors E and F provided
in the FTDA, and, as stated above, the legislative intent behind the
Act is to consider the factors independently, with no one factor being
dispositive.
188. Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., No. IP 97-1682 C M/S, 2000 WL
1428665, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2000).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(F) (2000).
190. Syndicate Sales, 192 F.3d at 641.
191. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 43 (1988).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228-29.
195. Id. at 222.
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After citing the above cases, the Third Circuit in Times Mirror
stated that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition further
supports the proposition that niche market fame is sufficient to protect
a mark from dilution.96 In so doing, the court quoted the following
language from Comment e of Section 25 of the Restatement:
A mark that is highly distinctive only to a select class or
group of purchasers may be protected from diluting uses di-
rected at that particular class or group. For example, a mark
may be highly distinctive among purchasers of a specific type
of product. In such circumstances, protection against a dilu-
tion of the mark's distinctiveness is ordinarily appropriate
only against uses specifically directed at that particular class
of purchasers ... ,97
However, the Third Circuit omitted the end of the same com-
ment, which states, "In such circumstances, protection against a dilu-
tion of the mark's distinctiveness is ordinarily appropriate only against
uses specifically directed at that particular class of purchasers; uses of
the mark in broader markets, although they may produce an incidental
diluting effect in the protected market, are not normally actionable. '" '9'
The end of the comment, left out of the Times Mirror opinion, is
significant because the type of protection afforded under the FTDA
would protect the mark's distinctiveness outside of the particular class
of purchasers in the niche market. In fact, the mark would be deemed
famous and deserving of protection on a national basis. The dissent-
ing opinion in Times Mirror echoed this concern. Judge Barry rea-
soned that in enacting the FTDA, Congress sought to protect only a
select and narrow class of truly famous and well-recognized marks. 9
"Without such a requirement, an anti-dilution statute becomes a
rogue law that turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into an
anti-competitive weapon."2 '
The dissenting opinion in Times Mirror further argued against a
niche market theory of fame. Judge Barry pointed out that the legisla-
tive history of the Act neither discusses, nor supports, such a theory. 21
If courts were to apply the "big fish in a small pond theory, '" 20 2 it is
196. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 164.
197. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e (1995)).
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e.
199. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 170-71 (Barry, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 171 (Barry, J., dissenting) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:108).
201. Id. at 173 (Barry, J., dissenting).
202. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:112 (stating that marks that are not famous on a na-
tional level but are well known in a defined trade or geographical area are called the "big fish in a
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hard to envision any consumer good or service that is not in a narrow
market of some type, "be it luxury cars, cameras, or sporting publica-
tions." 203 Taken as a whole, the legislative history thoroughly supports
the conclusion that the FTDA should be restricted to a narrow cate-
gory of marks to ensure that the Act "does not swallow infringement
law by allowing mark owners to end-run a likelihood of confusion
analysis which they fear-indeed, know-they cannot win. " 20 4
If the FTDA were to allow a niche market theory of fame, the
Act could consume infringement law. Protecting marks from an un-
authorized use in a same or similar market has traditionally been
within the grasp of the trademark infringement law and the likelihood
of confusion test. 20 5 If a locally famous mark can preclude other marks
in other channels from using the mark, every locally famous mark
could create a monopoly in that word or mark.20 6 This is clearly con-
trary to the intent of the FTDA .2 0  Furthermore, the dissenting opin-
ion endorsed the view that fame within the same channels of trade be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant does not dictate the conclusion that
the mark has sufficient fame to receive protection under the FTDA. °8
Despite the strong dissenting opinion, the Third Circuit held
that The Sporting News was famous in its niche market and therefore
entitled to protection under the FTDA.0 Such a holding is errone-
ous. While a finding of fame in a niche market can satisfy one of the
factors in a finding of overall fame, it should not, on its own, be a basis
for overall fame.
The Ninth Circuit in Avery Dennison illustrates the correct ap-
proach of applying niche fame as a factor rather than as an independ-
ently sufficient basis for fame. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since
successful dilution actions come closer than infringement actions to
granting "rights in gross," they should be reserved for a select class of
marks that have a powerful enough consumer association that even
noncompeting uses can impinge on their value1° There must be a
balance between protecting trademarks and allowing non-infringing
small pond" theory of relative strength). McCarthy, in light of the FTDA, does not support
such theory of fame.
203. Times Mirror, 212 F.3d at 173 (Barry, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 171 (Barry, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 173 (Barry, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 173-74 (Barry, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 174 (Barry, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 175 ( Barry, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 165.
210. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Schechter, supra note 14).
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uses.2" Allowing dilution protection based solely on a showing of dis-
tinctiveness would upset this balance and would overprotect trade-
marks at the cost of non-infringing uses. 212 For this reason, the Ninth
Circuit sees the "distinctive and famous" prong as reinstating a bal-
ancing test by limiting the class of trademarks eligible for protection
and minimizing the undue impact on other uses. 13
Therefore, a mark must be truly prominent and renowned to
meet the "famousness" element of the FTDA. " The court also ech-
oed the legislative intent that only a limited category of trademarks
that deserve a national remedy should be protected.2 1 1
After pointing out that only a limited category of marks deserve
protection, the Ninth Circuit applied the fame factors to the facts of
the case. In doing so, the court considered factors E and F together.216
The court recognized that although the language of the FTDA did not
incorporate the "substantial portion of the country" requirement as
evident in much of the legislative history, localized fame in a niche
market is only one factor in establishing fame.217 The court reasoned
that localized fame is possible only if the trading area of the plaintiff
includes the trading area of the defendant."8
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed Avery Dennison's niche market
fame. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
suggest that Avery Dennison had a significant amount of recognition
among Internet users or that Sumpton directed its e-mail services at
Avery Dennison's customer base. 219
In the case of the Barstucks hypothetical, a court may find that
the two uses of the "Barstucks" trademark are likely to cause customer
confusion. The court may, however, find that the use of the trade-
mark by the furniture manufacturer is likely to dilute the tea com-
pany's use. This finding, however, is dependent on a finding that the
tea company's use satisfies the famousness requirement of the FTDA.
The court should look at the breadth of the tea company's fame
as a factor in determining overall fame, not as dispositive of the issue.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id. (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998)).
215. Id. (quoting 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455 (1987)).
216. Id. at 877.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 877-78 (citing S. REP. No. 100-515, at 43 (1988); Washington Speakers Bureau,
Inc v. Leading Auths, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503-04 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th
Cir. 2000)).
219. Id. at 878.
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Even though Barstucks' trademark has gained fame over the past dec-
ade, this does not automatically confer "famousness" on the mark. It
may, however, satisfy one factor in the overall test for fame.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to bring uniformity to the area of federal anti-dilution
protection, courts need to adopt a uniform standard of fame. As illus-
trated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, courts are currently split as to
how the "fame" requirement should be interpreted. By extracting
elements of the two circuits' opinions in Times Mirror and Avery Den-
nison, courts can take two significant steps toward a uniform standard
of fame. First, a mark should not be subject to separate tests for dis-
tinctiveness and fame. Since a mark must be famous to receive protec-
tion, and a test of famousness incorporates distinctiveness, it is redun-
dant to require two tests. Second, a trademark owner does not deserve
to protect his mark on a national level by proving niche market fame.
Niche market fame should be allowed to establish only one factor in
proving overall fame. As the legislative history of the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act indicates, each factor should be weighed independ-
ently, and no one factor should be dispositive.
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